Marwa

(Koker, 2017)

The most rapid genocide in human history took place in 1994 in Rwanda. 1,174,000 people were murdered, mostly with machetes, in 100 days, 400 every hour, 7 every minute. UN soldiers were present but they were given the order not to act unless they were personally attacked.

Noted as one of the most abhorrent atrocities in human history, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 circulates much International Relations discourse in the relativity of “humanitarian intervention”, or the failure of it. According to the 1999 UN Security Council report, approximately 800,000 people were killed during the genocide between April and July of 1994, by which the lack of decisive action taken by the international community led to great criticism, and it was consequently deemed as ‘the single worst decision the United Nations has ever made’ (Kennedy, 2006). In assessing the argument of humanitarian intervention along the case study of Rwanda 1994, I will be presenting an overview of the events that unfolded; analysing the effectivity and legitimacy of the international response to this crisis; as well as evaluating the contemporary importance of Rwanda as a case study in the evolution of the humanitarian intervention debate. The main argument of this case study is based around, firstly, the lack of acknowledgement by major actors to take action in preventing such violence abroad, and secondly, the selectivity of powerful countries and the UN to administer a ‘political will’ to take up a responsibility where national interests are put to question in comparison to other cases alike.

The events of the Rwandan genocide unfolded from years of ethnic tensions and conflict between the two groups, Hutus and Tutsis. Prior to the colonial influence in Rwanda there was not a major distinction between the Hutus and Tutsis whom spoke the same language; inter-marriage was common amongst them (Wheeler, 2002); and less than a decade before the outbreak, economic development and inter-ethnic relations between Hutus and Tutsis did not erupt international concern (Hehir, 2013). However after the Hutus rebelled against the Belgian-backed Tutsi government in 1959, a civil war broke out between the two groups, leading to the formation of internal and external militias (RPF) and brought wide attention to the international community. In the effort of mediating the civil war, the international community established the Arusha Accords (1993) to, in effect, formally put an end to the civil war and implement a power-distributing structure within the Rwandan political system. Despite the UN’s establishment of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to monitor its regulation, the Accords did not seem to fulfil a resolution. After the signing of the Accords and the contribution of internal and external developments, an explosion of violence spread across Rwanda, which intensified with the killing of President Habyarimana and President Ntaryamira of Burundi and extremist attacks occurred within Habyarimana’s regime into an ‘uncontrollable spontaneous ethnic violence’ (de Waal, 1994). The genocide thereon became one of the most dreadful events of the 20th century, during which the stand of the international community continues to be observed among critical perspectives on the idea of international involvement in intra-state conflicts. 

In the early 1990s, at a time when UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and many other statesmen expressed an optimism toward an evolving international community by its members ‘joining efforts to reduce conflicts and alleviating the suffering of those affected by them’ (Ludlow, 1999). Although, following these new attitudes, the international community remained idle during the mass atrocities of over half a million people killed in the Rwandan genocide. The international response to the genocide and particularly the inaction of power-bearing countries underwent wide criticism. Belgian and French troops were quickly removed by their governments claiming that the ‘UNAMIR was “powerless” and at risk in such a worsening situation’ as stated in a letter to the UN Secretary General (UN Security Council, 1994). This indicates the selective priorities of external (Western) powers, while those Rwandan personnel at the embassy were left to endure the violence (Waal; Omar, 1995). France, Belgium and the US did not acknowledge the genocide as they ‘lacked information on it’ which was seen as ironic, as smaller countries like New Zealand and Czech Republic had identified the genocide, whereas these more powerful countries had not (Kroslak, 2007). Additionally, the genocide was ‘portrayed as a civil war’ rather than genocide which enabled the US, UK and France to impose legitimacy on their decision not to intervene (Wheeler, 2002). The UN’s reluctance to deploy troops to stop the atrocity even after its acknowledgement is speculated as an explicit US policy aim whereby the US forced efforts to deter the authorisation of UN reinforcements (Power, 2001). While it is argued that the complexity of the conflict led to the inaction of the international community (Des Forges, 1999), one can highlight that the lack of political will and the absence of the UN to take responsibility played a prominent position in its failure of halting the crisis. This lack of political will impacted the response of the Secretariat; the decision-making by the Security Council; and the repetitive dilemmas to deploy troops to the UNAMIR. It can be said that the UN is thus a puppet in the control of the powerful, with no army; lacking autonomous administrative power; and dominated by the P5 members in decision-making processes through biased international law. In addition, one can underline that the lack of political will was also a result of the critical US participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia around the same period. The US indicated that they “did not want another case like Mogadishu” whereby many peace-keeping troops were killed, and consequently the US remained reluctant to act in concern of Americans. Also, another intervention or peace-keeping operation in the heart of Africa was seen as being a trigger for more widespread criticism. Despite Belgium’s awareness of the situation on ground and its ability to stop the genocide, the “shadow of Somalia” brought a concern to act assertively and suffer consequences by voters back home (Maritz, 2012). Nonetheless, were an early intervention to have taken effect, masses of lives could have been saved (CCPDC, 1997), signifying the underlying strategic interest by which the UN lacked support. 

The contemporary importance of the Rwanda case continues to be at the forefront of critical analyses in the development of humanitarian intervention. During the Cold War there were many atrocities such as the Cambodian massacres (1975) that were “lessons” which led the international community to commit to the ‘Never Again’ refrain, however Rwanda framed a clear ‘indictment’ of this commitment (Jones, 1995). Rather, the killings were not to be described as a genocide or ‘the g-word’ which would have accordingly obliged the international community to intervene (William, 2000). One can maintain that in order to make assertive decisions and implement good governance for preventing such atrocities, the institutions responsible must undergo development when reflecting on the outcomes of past events. For example, a reform and advanced attention by the UN, in particular its greater power-bearing states, is essential in fulfilling this objective to prevent human rights issues, as indicated in the second pillar of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. Further, the Security Council should encourage the development of institutions and civil society organisations toward establishing good governance as maintained in the principle of the Responsibility While Protecting (Agwu, 2014). The compulsion of national interest and state sovereignty should be eliminated in favour of human rights and humanitarian principles. However the likeliness of this is questionable whereby permanent members of the Security Council, such as Russia and China, continue to expose stubborn behaviour in dealing with conflict areas like Syria and Iran’s nuclear deal crises. States that fail to uphold the obligation of international law, in particular where human suffering is at hand, ‘forfeits its right to sovereignty, political independence, and territorial inviolability’ (Agwu, 2014). Thus, the induction of humanitarian intervention should be more distinct, and where the protection of humanitarian principles are at stake, state sovereignty should not act as an obstruction.

Although NGOs have routinely stated that more could have been done to stop the Rwandan genocide, the lack of widespread media coverage on the issue internationally during its time can arguably have an impact on the responsibility to act. Despite prominent developments since the 1990s, if the question on the possibility of another Rwanda-style genocide happening today were to arise, the limitation of the media in publicising the events certainly holds a significant stand. The absence of television images of the genocide can be said to have had a major impact because in contemporary Western society, events that are not publicised across screens do not seem to exist. This is already happening in regards to the atrocities towards the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and the lack of support in Somalia’s drought; evidently, selective crises are spread to the international sphere even though we are in such an information age. Further instances show that although the capacity to respond has improved (militarily); the willingness remains questionable. On the other hand, peace-keeping and military intervention operations can also result in major blowbacks as so in Iraq ( 2003), therefore it is unpredictable to determine the success of an intervention. For example, the influx of refugees may only be of concern to certain states as a consequence of a crisis, as seen in the influx of Haitian refugees to the US (1994) and the US reaction. 

Therefore, Rwanda is internationally accepted as a case whereby the UN failed to act decisively, despite the attestation to ‘never again’. The international response to the crisis in Syria is also viewed as an indication that ‘little has changed since Rwanda’, even with the acknowledgement that more action should have been exhausted (Hehir, 2013). It becomes clear that strategic importance and political will are pivotal factors in the face of taking responsibility against human sufferings and injustice abroad, particularly when compared to instances such as the NATO expansion interests portrayed in its intervention into Kosovo and the silence towards Myanmar massacres today.

References

Aja Agwu, Fred. “The Challenge Of Humanitarian Intervention Since Rwanda”. Council of Councils. N.p., 2014. Web. 13 Apr. 2017.

Beloff, Jonathan. “‘One Rwanda’ For All”. (2017): n. pag. Web. 13 Apr. 2017.

Des Forges, Alison. “Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide In Rwanda”. Human Rights Watch (1999): n. pag. Web. 13 Apr. 2017.

Hehir, Aidan. Humanitarian Intervention. 1st ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Print.

Kuperman, Alan J. “Rwanda In Retrospect”. Foreign Affairs 79.1 (2000): 94. Web.

Ludlow, D.R.L. “Humanitarian Intervention And The Rwandan Genocide”. The Journal of Conflict Studies 19.1 (1999): n. pag. Web. 13 Apr. 2017.

Maritz, Dominique. “Rwandan Genocide: Failure Of The International Community?”. E-International Relations. N.p., 2012. Web. 13 Apr. 2017.

Power, Samantha. “By-standers to Genocide”. The Atlantic (2001). Web. 13 Apr. 2017.

United Nations Security Council,. 1999. Report. 13 Apr. 2017.

Waal, Alex et al. “No Such Thing As Humanitarian Intervention – Harvard International Review”. Harvard International Review. N.p., 2017. Web. 13 Apr. 2017.